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ABSTRACT
Hurricane Katrina did massive damage because New Orleans and the Gulf Coast were not
appropriately protected.  Wherever natural disasters threaten, the government -- in its traditional role
as public goods provider -- must decide what level of protection to provide to an area.  It does so by
purchasing protective capital, such as levees for a low-lying city.
We show that if private capital is more likely to locate in better-protected areas, then the
marginal social value of protection will increase with the level of protection provided.  That is, the
benefit function is convex, contrary to the normal assumption of concavity.  When the government
protects and the private sector invests, due to the ill-behaved nature of the benefit function, there may
be multiple Nash equilibria.  Policy makers must compare them, rather than merely follow local
optimality conditions, to find the equilibrium offering the highest social welfare.
There  is  usually  considerable  uncertainty  about  the  amount  of  investment  that  will
accompany any level of protection, further complicating the government’s choice problem.  We
show that when deciding on the current level of protection, the government must take account of the
option value of increasing the level of protection in the future.
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1.  Introduction 
  The devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina raised many difficult policy 
questions, not least of which is the level of physical protection that should be afforded to 
investments in flood-prone areas.  This question is one that has been raised many times, 
usually following a catastrophe, such as the Midwest floods of 1993, in which around 20 
million acres in nine states were flooded.   
Questions of the appropriate level of protection and investment are not limited to 
flooding, but are also salient for other risks, such as terrorism and global warming, where 
the respective protections might consist of bolstered intelligence services or lesser 
emissions of greenhouse gases.  Our model is general, and the analysis applies to 
situations stretching from protecting against intentional dangers, such as crime and 
terrorism; to dealing with risks that are the joint product of human and natural activity, 
such as future coastal flooding from global warming.   
Two events provide the immediate inspiration for our investigation of this class of 
situations.  First is the destruction of much of New Orleans and substantial portions of the 
Gulf Coast by Hurricane Katrina.  The second event is the ongoing effort to rebuild New 
Orleans, with both public and private entities playing major roles.  In all these cases, the 
levels of protection and investment will be jointly determined:  the models of this paper, 
with slight adjustment, will apply.  
The challenge in all of these cases is to determine what level of protection is 
appropriate.  Since such risks are low probability, and often unique, decision makers 
rarely have experience to guide them.  Not surprisingly, they sometimes turn to rules of 
thumb.  Thus for floods, our prime case study, they might propose protection from the 
100-year flood, 500-year flood, or 1000-year flood.  For example, the 100-year flood is 
used as a trigger for many policies in the U.S. – the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) removes areas protected by 100 year levees from flood hazard maps and 
the National Flood Insurance Program allows development in areas raised about the 100 
year flood or protected by 100 year levees (Pinter 2005).  Rules of thumb ignore both the 
benefits and costs of providing flood protection.  If the costs of protection were tenfold 
higher for one area than another, or if one area had 100 times the assets of the other, the 
“100-year flood” prescription would be the same.  In addition, terms like “the 1000-year   3
flood” are often misinterpreted.  A 1000-year flood has a 1 in 1000 chance of occurring 
in any given year.  It does not mean that an area is protected for 1000 years or that once a 
big storm hits, another will not occur for 1000 years.  Nor are these probabilities exact: in 
many regions river gauge records do not stretch back far enough to calculate probabilities 
based on frequency data, so these are estimated probabilities – although they could be 
improved by incorporating geologic and archeological data (Sparks 2006).  Furthermore, 
climate change and natural climatic variability will surely alter the magnitude of a 1000-
year flood over time; the level of protection appropriate today will likely not be the level 
of protection needed in a decade.  Simple rules of thumb and unguided intuitions are 
misleading and should be rejected in the risk-protection context, particularly since low 
probabilities are involved, learning takes time, and there are complex interactions 
between protection and investment decisions. 
Our proposed methodology is to examine the costs and benefits of providing 
protection from both natural and manmade disasters.  We analyze investment and 
protection decisions through an economic lens.  This paper contributes to the growing 
literature on the economics of hazards (see for example: (Kunreuther and Rose 2004)).  
Our analysis proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we provide for the theory 
underlying the two basic relationships that we posit: (1) in risk-prone areas, the level of 
private investment responds positively to the level of protection, and (2) the level of 
protection in an area – as chosen or directed by the government – responds positively to 
the value of private assets.  We also develop a model of this observed interdependence of 
investment and protection decisions.  We show that independent optimization of 
investment and protection can produce a poorly behaved benefit function.  The result is 
that society, following marginal conditions, can easily get stuck at an inferior 
equilibrium.   
In section 3, we briefly examine situations where human capital is at risk of a 
disaster.  Section 4 addresses protection as an imperfect public good.  We examine 
whether and when a shock that exogenously increases investment, e.g., an unexpected 
jump in productivity, will decrease the equilibrium level of protection.  Finally, in section 
5, we examine the government’s choice problem when there is uncertainty regarding 
investment levels, investigating both when there is no possibility for adjustment and the   4
highly relevant case where phased expansion of protection investments is costly, 
considering situations without and with multiple equilibria.  The sixth section concludes.  
 
2.  The Observed Interactive Determination of Investment and Protection 
  While private entities can protect themselves from some risks, for many risks the 
government provides the primary protection.  Government may or may not tax the 
citizens of the protected area for the full expenses associated with the protection, but it is 
reasonable to view the protection as provided by one unified decision-maker.  Private 
actors may sometimes supplement public protection efforts, such as raising their homes 
on stilts when building in the floodplain or investing in alarm systems to cope with crime.  
This paper does not address the complementarities or substitutability of private and 
public investments in protection, but instead focuses on cases where private investments 
will be minimal – as when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructs levees or with 
federal counter-terrorism efforts.
1  The government decides how much protection to offer 
citizens, for example, to reduce risk by a given increment, given increasing costs to 
protection.  Individuals and firms decide how much to invest in risk-prone locations.  
Experience demonstrates that the government responds to investment levels, that is, 
offers higher protection when there are more assets at risk, and similarly, investors 
respond to protection, increasing the capital stock in areas with higher protection levels.  
When government and investors optimize separately, choosing a protection level for a 
given level of investment or vice versa, society attains a local optimum.  However, this 
may not be a global optimum.   
Across the nation, there are many examples where higher levels of protection has 
spurred higher levels of investment or development.  Levees built to lower the risk of 
flooding are a good example.  When the Monarch levee in Missouri was raised to protect 
against the five-hundred-year flood, for example, investment in Chesterfield Valley 
skyrocketed.  Similarly, completion of the Riverside Levee is expected, by Senator Kit 
Bond’s office, to foster the creation of 11 million square feet of industrial, commercial, 
and retail space in Kansas City.  Conversely, when perceived risk levels rise, as in 
                                                 
1Government may also regulate.  In spring 2006, pending federal regulations required that in order to 
qualify for aid or lower insurance premiums, homes in some areas of rebuilt New Orleans had to be placed 
on three foot stilts.     5
vulnerable areas of several Florida counties that were just missed by Hurricane Andrew, 
investment is depressed and property values fall (Hallstrom and Smith 2005).  The 
positive impact of protection on investment is clear in other contexts as well.  An increase 
in the number of police has been found to reduce crime (Levitt 1997; Klick and Tabarrok 
2005), safer neighborhoods receive more investment (Lehrer 2000), and areas seeing 
larger decreases in air pollution experience higher population growth (Kahn 2000).     
There are also many examples of how protection responds to investment.  
Increased development caused government to increase protection is Sacramento, 
California and the surrounding Sacramento-San Joaquin Valley.  The area is prone to the 
regular flooding of the two rivers, yet development is continuing at a rapid pace, in part 
due to housing pressures in the Bay Area.  Many of the levees in the region need repair, 
and they do not provide the level of protection demanded by other major cities in such a 
risky location.  The continued construction of new homes and businesses has forced state 
lawmakers to consider plans to upgrade protection in the region.  In fall 2005, the state’s 
Congressional Delegation secured $39 million in federal funding to increase the level of 
flood protection around Sacramento, and Senator Feinstein has pledged to seek further 
funds (Feinstein 2005).     
States and localities sometimes invest in their own flood protection, but more 
often flood control projects are undertaken by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  Local 
governments approach the Corps when they feel their protection level is too low for the 
capital and lives at risk in their jurisdiction.  The Corps then studies the proposed project, 
and assesses the support among possible non-federal sponsors (since 1986 there have 
been cost-sharing requirements with local governments) (Carter and Cody 2005).  If the 
project is favorably reported, it will be submitted for Congress’ annual authorization and 
appropriation of funds for construction.  Thus, as investment increases in an area prone to 
flooding, pressure is brought to bear on local officials, who lobby the Corps for a project 
and lobby state lawmakers to fight for appropriations.  While the level of investment can 
trigger political action directly – as more people locate in the floodplain and demand  
protection – it also enters the Corps cost-benefit analysis of the proposed flood project.  
All Corps projects must have a cost-benefit ratio less than one.  When more assets are at 
risk, the benefits associated with protection are higher, increasing the likelihood that the   6
project will pass the analysis.  For both of these reasons, higher investments in 
floodplains usually lead to higher protection. 
Decisions regarding investment and protection levels are currently being 
discussed and made all along the Gulf, and particularly in New Orleans.  As rebuilding is 
contemplated and undertaken in the city, residents and businesses must make difficult 
decisions about whether, where, and when to rebuild.  The Louisiana Recovery Authority 
created by Governor Kathleen Blanco is working to coordinate the enormous task of 
rebuilding.  The decisions of residents and businesses are dependent on the decisions of 
others, including the local and federal government.  Progress is being made, but it is not 
yet clear whether some of the most damaged neighborhoods will be rebuilt or when 
public services will resume in various areas.  If many residents do not return, then 
businesses that depend on the residents as customers are unlikely to return.  Yet if 
businesses return, residents are more likely to move back, as they will have access to 
goods, services, and jobs.  Similarly, there are mostly positive economic interactions 
between businesses, and mostly positive social interactions among residents.  Private 
actors also must assess risk levels, determining the likelihood that protection will be 
bolstered around New Orleans, or just returned to pre-Katrina levels.  The Corps of 
Engineers has planned and Congress has appropriated funding for levees to be returned to 
pre-Katrina levels.  The levees should be completed in June 2006, but money has not 
been authorized yet for further increases in protection, although some residents are 
lobbying for an increase to protection from Category 5 storms.  If protection is not 
increased, it is likely that fewer people will return to some of the most vulnerable 
locations; yet if people do not rebuild in the most damaged neighborhoods, there is less 
incentive to provide costly increases in protection.  In effect, all the stakeholders in 
rebuilding New Orleans are caught in a complicated coordination game.  It does not seem 
at all certain that they will find their way to an optimum.   
 
2.1. A Model of the Joint Determination of Investment and Protection 
We now construct a model of this joint determination problem.  Consider the 
usual model of public projects to protect private assets.  At the outset, we assume a one-
period model.  The government can decide on the level of protection, p, for private assets.    7
In particular, if the level of protection is p, the probability that the private assets are lost 
equals 1-p.  The cost to the government of achieving a level of protection p is given by 
c(p), which is an increasing and convex function.  We assume (i) that risk aversion of 
private asset holders is not a concern, e.g., because their assets are fully insured
2 by 
policies written by geographically diversified companies, (ii) that should the unprotected 
risk occur there will be a complete loss of all assets, and (iii) that the government 
functions on a cost-benefit basis. 
In many cases, this last assumption is not heroic.  Even when a cost-benefit 
analysis is not required, policy makers likely weigh costs and benefits in some fashion.  
And as stated earlier, projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers must pass a cost-
benefit analysis, so for flood protection decisions, at least, assumption (iii) is satisfied.  
Yet, while the Corps is seen to be “the political godfather of cost-benefit analysis” (the 
Flood Control Act of 1936 stated that the federal government would support flood 
projects in which the benefits outweighed the costs), it has “also long been suspected of 
an institutional bias in favor of projects that can add significantly to its own budget 
allocations” (Persky 2001).  Corps analyses often neglect many benefits and costs, such 
as social disruption or public health problems (Carter 2005).  They often also fail to 
monetize environmental impacts, although that is changing.  At times, this suspicion has 
erupted into national controversy, such as when a whistle blower in February 2000 
accused the Corps of deliberately altering a cost-benefit analysis to justify a $1.2 billion 
lock expansion project on the Mississippi, prompting federal investigation that confirmed 
the allegations.  In this paper, we assume that costs and benefits are not manipulated for 
political reasons. 
  
2.1.1 Fixed Asset Base   
Initially, we assume there is a fixed level of private assets, K.  The assets should 
be protected so as to minimize the sum of expected losses and the cost of protection, 
namely: 
 
                                                 
2 Full insurance would require that both loss of services and the value of life disruption be covered.   8
(1)  [ ] min (1 ) ( )
p p Kc p −+ . 
 
Taking derivatives and setting them equal to zero, this leads to the traditional efficiency 
condition that  
 
(2)  c'(p) = K.   
 
Thus, at the optimum, the cost of increasing by 1% the protection of $1 billion in assets 
would be $10 million. 
  For most risks we consider, such as terrorism or flooding, we would expect the 
marginal cost of reducing the probability of an adverse event to increase exceedingly 
rapidly as p got close to 1.  As Prospect Theory alerts us, people tend to put additional 
weight on probabilities of 1 or 0 when it comes to risks (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), 
but common sense suggests we have to live with some positive risk.  Thus, we would 
expect even highly valuable assets to sometimes be lost.  As the risk analyst’s maxim 
says, if your bridges are never falling down you are building them too strong. 
 
2.1.2 Responsive asset base 
In general, we would expect the asset base to respond to the level of protection 
just as the level of protection responds to the asset base.  That is, there should be some 
form of interactive determination, with private investors responding to the level of 
protection just as protection responds to the investment level.  In reality, it is frequently 
not possible for the asset base to change incrementally, down as well as up, because 
investments in private capital are clearly lumpy: we do not build half a house or a quarter 
of a retail establishment.  Incremental changes may be even harder for public protection 
efforts.  Building a levee 10 feet high and then extending it to 15 feet is much more 
expensive than building it at a 15-foot level initially, so it is unlikely we would observe 
smooth marginal changes in protection investments. 
Efficiency thus requires that society undertake some form of cost-benefit analysis 
at the outset, deciding what level of protection to offer, and at least predicting the 
consequent level of private capital.  This issue is exceedingly live in New Orleans at the   9
moment, as both government and residents struggle with making rebuilding decisions.  
New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin appointed a Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) 
Committee to make recommendations.  A proposal in which neighborhoods would have 
to demonstrate that a “critical mass” of residents was returning for neighborhoods to be 
rebuilt met with anger from many residents anxious to return regardless of what their 
neighbors decide.  Yet it demonstrates the difficulty in making decisions of where to 
invest public money in rebuilding and increased protection when the level of private 
investment in damaged areas is uncertain.   
While government must estimate private investment levels, private actors must 
predict government protection policies, and the decisions of other private parties, e.g., a 
dry cleaner must predict whether competitors will locate nearby.  This latter process is a 
normal part of investment, quite apart from hurricanes and floods, fires and terrorist 
attacks,
3 and we shall assume that private investment decisions are a function of the usual 
factors, plus the level of protection.   
We also assume that government allows private entities to put assets in harm’s 
way.  In some contexts, the public sector may place restrictions on private investment.  In 
New Orleans, for example, the idea of not rebuilding the most devastated wards was 
raised, but was met with stiff resistance.  Due to that opposition, it now appears that New 
Orleanians can rebuild as they wish.  Similarly, some localities restrict development in 
floodplains, but such restrictions are more the exception that the rule.  Government 
usually lets private investors put their assets at risk, though it knows that it will likely 
spend substantial funds bailing them out when disasters occur.  Many public policies, 
such as California’s Fair Access to Insurance Requirements, which subsidize construction 
in fire-prone areas (Kennedy 2006), actually encourage development in risk-prone areas.  
Taxes on development in risky locations could prevent such inefficiencies, but they may 
be politically infeasible.  It might also be more efficient for the government to refrain 
from implicitly subsidizing investment in risky locations by not providing disaster relief, 
and only allowing building when private entities take on the full risk themselves.  
However, there are many situations in which the government cannot credibility commit 
                                                 
3 Private investment decisions get compressed in recovery efforts, which makes the adjustment process 
more difficult.    10
to non-intervention (Rodrik and Zeckhauser 1988).  The government’s inability to 
credibly commit to withholding disaster relief encourages excess development in hazard 
prone locations.  This is the moral hazard problem at the heart of the dilemma of the 
Good Samaritan discussed by James Buchanan (1975). 
 
2.2 Private Investment Decisions 
Let f(K) be the profitability from a level of private capital that is fully protected 
(so think of f(K) as  [ ] max ( , )
L FKL r K w L − − , where F(.,.) is a standard production 
function, L is labor input, r is the rental rate of capital and w is the wage rate).  The 
investor’s net profit is: 
 
(3)  π(K, p) = f(K) – (1-p)K.  
 
Thus, through its effect on protection p, government spending indirectly enters the private 
production function.  Previous authors, including Kaizuka (1965), Arrow and Kurz 
(1970), and Barro (1990), have analyzed general cases where government spending is an 
input to private production.  Our analysis, in contrast, focuses on government spending 
on protection. By definition, protection enters the private production function in a 
specific way (namely, the return to protection equals K) -- allowing us to make new 
inferences. 
  Given that expected private profit is a function of the level of protection, firms 
should have an understanding of the risks they face.  Firms, however, may not have the 
expertise to fully assess the risks of an area, may not have the time and resources to do 
so, or may believe others have more information.  In this case, they may take the 
investment decisions of others as signals of risk levels.  For example, when Wal-Mart 
agreed to open a store in the floodplain of Chesterfield Valley, Missouri, others quickly 
followed suit.  One business owner who decided to follow Wal-Mart was quoted in the 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch as saying, “‘Why were we not concerned?’...‘ I have a one-word 
answer for that question: Wal-Mart. If the levee's good enough for…that crowd, then it's 
good enough for us’” (Heisler 2003).  While this attitude can increase efficiency if those 
with correct information are followed by others, it can also lead to herd behavior   11
(Banerjee 1992), cascades (Kuran and Sunstein 1999), mutual reassurance, and other 
suboptimal outcomes.   
Even when private actors do independently assess risk, errors in assessment of 
risk levels are common.  For example, the findings of Prospect Theory suggest that 
individuals homogenize both low and high probabilities, and attach extra value to 
certainty (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  These biases, together with other well 
documented heuristics and biases (Kahneman and Tversky 2000) are likely to distort risk 
assessment, and lead to decisions that would not be chosen were expected benefits and 
costs accurately assessed.  Thus, due to low-probability homogenization, individuals 
might distinguish little between risks of 1% and 0.1%, even though the former is 10 times 
as large.  More specifically, scholars have explored many reasons why our investment in 
reducing the risks from natural disasters may be suboptimal, including the human 
tendency toward myopia, neglect of low-probability events, and susceptibility to status-
quo bias and recency bias (Kunreuther, Meyer et al. 2002).  Our model, however, 
assumes that probabilities are assessed correctly by private actors. 
So, given a level of protection p, the firm will select a level of capital so that  
 
(4)   f '(K) = 1-p. 
 
Equation (4) says to invest until the marginal return equals the probability of loss.  This 
return is measured as the excess return over the opportunity cost of capital.  Thus, a firm 
that normally invests to get 15% returns at the margin facing a 5% probability of a 
catastrophe loss would invest until its rate of return fell to 20%. 
Our interest is in the returns to all firms, each of which engages in an equivalent 
optimization.  However, there is no loss of generality in talking about a single firm that 
aggregates all the firms, since the firms have no collective action problem, and each 
enjoys the same marginal condition.  Any externalities from firm to firm are thus 
included in the aggregate firm’s production function.   
Assume that f(K) is increasing and concave.  In this case, (4) has a unique 
solution, which is given by: 
   12
(5)  K
* = K(p).  
 
Moreover, since f(K) is concave, f '(K) is a decreasing function and therefore K(p) is 
increasing in p.  Thus, private capital will increase in response to higher levels of 
protection, as intuition would suggest, and as occurs in the real world, as our earlier 
discussion showed.  Thus, total private benefit from protection can be given by: 
 
(6)  b(p) = π(K(p), p) = f(K(p)) – (1-p) K(p). 
 
2.3 The Overall Optimization 
Looking at the cost-benefit analysis, the overall optimization is choose K and p to 
maximize expected total surplus: 
 
(7)  [ ]
, max ( ) (1 ) ( )
Kp f Kp K c p − −− . 
 
The necessary conditions for maximizing total surplus are: 
(8a)  c'(p) = K, 
and 
(8b)   f '(K) = 1-p. 
 
Note that equation (2) defines the appropriate level of protection, and that equation (4) 
defines the appropriate level of investment, and that they are identical respectively to (8a) 
and (8b).  We can also write the inverse function for (2) and (8a), namely, 
 
(9)   p
* = h(K). 
 
  In the wake of Katrina, there have been calls for New Orleans to emulate the 
Netherlands, where people who have managed floods for over a thousand years, and two-
thirds of their country below sea level, by adopting higher levels of protection.  Yet, flood 
control in the Netherlands grew out of a cost-benefit analysis (which also considered 
indirect benefits of flood control options, such as reducing salinity intrusion or increasing   13
recreational opportunities) undertaken following a devastating flood in 1953 (Gerritsen 
2005).  The most densely populated and economically important areas of the Netherlands 
receive protection from a 10,000-year storm.  Rural areas are only protected from a storm 
with an occurrence probability of 1 in 1,250 years (The Royal Netherlands Embassy 
2005).  Instead of blindly copying the levels of protection of the Dutch, it is more 
sensible to follow their example of basing protection levels on the costs and benefits of 
protection, which vary across locations.   
In the frictionless world where the firm and the public protector could adjust to 
the other without cost, we could be confident that the necessary conditions listed above 
would be satisfied. However, these conditions are not sufficient; even with costless 
adjustment, we might not get to the efficient outcome.  
We can imagine three pure ways the two parties might adjust to each other:  (1) 
the government and the private sector can engage in discussions, equivalent to what the 
BNOB Committee is doing, and project the function K(p), and then conduct a cost-
benefit analysis to determine p; (2) the government can conjecture the K(p) function and 
pick the optimal level of protection, p
*;  or (3) the private sector can build, implicitly 
projecting the level of protection, h(K).  Under (3), individual firms would have to project 
how much other private sector players will invest, i.e., which will give the level of K, and 
also equation (9), which tells how the government responds to K.  In practice, we expect 
that some combination of (1) and (2) will be employed.  There will be public-private 
discussions, but the government will commit first to a protection plan.  
While this discussion posits a single period, the real world is dynamic: investment 
takes place over time; some modes of protection take time to build, etc.  Presumably, 
investors would put some capital in place before protection is complete, reasonably 
confident that there will not be a low probability catastrophe in the short period before 
the protection gets in place, and that the gains from being in place during that period 
would more than offset any expected losses.  The precise timing of optimal investment in 
such situations, particularly when we may be learning more about risk levels, is a worthy 
subject for future study.  Any dynamic formulation would require significant 
complications.  Many additional factors – such as wrong projections coupled with 
indivisible investments or protection measures – could lead to an outcome well away   14
from the optimum.  In the next subsection, we retain the single-period model, with 
simultaneous adjustment of investment and protection until an equilibrium is reached. 
 
2.4 Upward-Sloping Marginal Benefit 
We have discussed that the cost function, c(p), should be expected to have rapidly 
increasing costs as p is driven toward 1.  Thus, we assume that c' > 0 and c" > 0.  That is, 
we posit a well-behaved cost function with upward sloping marginal costs: getting rid of 
something undesirable is increasingly costly. 
The total private returns from protection b(p) = π(K(p), p), however, does not 
behave well, even if its individual components are well behaved.  By the envelope 
theorem, the slope of b(p) equals K(p), and the total benefit of protection increases with 
the level of protection, as expected.  However, the second derivative of b(p), the slope of 
the marginal benefits, is not well behaved.  To see this, recall that for each value of p, the 
marginal benefit of protection is equal to K(p).  We saw earlier that K(p) is an increasing 
function.  Thus, the marginal benefit of protection is upward sloping or, in other words, 
the total private benefit of protection increases at an increasing rate.  Such behavior is 
poorly behaved in the classic sense that we usually assume decreasing returns to 
something good. 
Figure 1 plots the private return to protection π(K, p) for various levels of K.  
Since b(p) is simply this return evaluated at the optimal choice of private assets, it is 
equal to the upper envelope of the lines in the graph.
4 
 
                                                 
4 The graph is based on f(K) = K
1/2- K /10.   15

























2.5 Possibility of Multiple Equilibria 
Note that both the benefits and costs of protection have positive second 
derivatives. Without further regularity conditions, these curves could cross many times.   
Figure 2 depicts marginal cost and benefit curves, c'(p) and b'(p), to illustrate a possible 
situation.
5  Here, if the decision maker merely looked locally, he might choose to protect 
at A, the point where further protection becomes not worthwhile.  But it is better to 
protect at C, since the gains in going to C, namely the area between the marginal benefit 
and marginal cost curves between B and C, are greater than the losses entailed, namely 
the area between the curves between A and B.   
 
                                                 
5 These curves were drawn for the functions f(K) =  K
1/2- K /10 and c(p) = 20 (0.5p
2 – 0.7p – 0.01 log(1-p)).   16



















Imposing regularity conditions on c(p) and b(p), such as requiring that c'''(p)- 
b'''(p)>0 for all p, can ensure that these curves cross at most twice, and that therefore 
there is at most one local maximum.  However, there is no compelling reason to assume 
that such regularity conditions would be satisfied. 
The intuition behind the multiple equilibria is that government protection and 
private investment reinforce each other.  The returns to protection increase as private 
investment rises and the returns to private investment increase as protection rises.  This 
can create regions where there are increasing returns to an increase in either protection or 
investment, which leads to multiple equilibria.  A similar intuition underlies the findings 
on multiple equilibria in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and in Kunreuther and Heal 
(2003). In these models investments of different private parties reinforce each other, 
though Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny note that analogous complementarities between 
private and government investment exist. 
 
 
3. Human Capital as an Asset   17
Our analysis thus far has posited that only physical capital is at risk.  However, 
most threats to physical capital threaten human capital as well.  Threats vary dramatically 
on the ratio of human to physical capital at stake.  Some risks are overwhelmingly risks 
to human life or wellbeing – this includes crimes such as rape and murder, or threats such 
as avian flu and germ warfare – while others are more exclusively risks to property, such 
as terrorist attacks on infrastructure.  The vast majority of risks, however, such as fires, 
earthquakes, floods, and terrorism threaten both human life and wellbeing and physical 
assets. In short, to consider protection and investment regarding individual threats 
adequately, we also need to consider the risks to human capital, e.g., valuation of life and 
limb. 
The large literature on the valuation of a statistical life (VSL) contains a variety of 
studies that estimate individuals’ willingness to pay for reductions in risk levels (Viscusi 
and Aldy 2003).  While willingness to pay for protection is clearly income-dependent, 
this does not mean that it is always lower-income households that are exposed to greater 
risks.  For example, we would expect higher-income households to be exposed to more 
amenity risks – risks that have associated with them a valuable amenity – such as beach-
front houses vulnerable to hurricanes.  We would expect to see more lower-income 
households exposed to noxious risks – risks that have no benefit associated with them, 
such as proximity to a toxic waste facility.  Willingness to pay to avoid risk cannot be 
uncoupled from ability to pay, which raises many equity questions.     
Let us put aside equity concerns for the moment.  The income dependent nature of 
willingness to pay for protection suggests that following a reduction in risk, the income 
distribution in an area will shift upward over time.  Thus, as protection goes up, 
additional gains in protection are worth more to the populace.  Consider the implications 
for a community that is riddled with crime, but must pay for its own police services.  
Assume that given the current valuation of the citizens for crime protection, it is not 
worthwhile to provide much protection.  A substantial anti-crime campaign, however, 
might attract individuals to the community who would value reduction in crime risk 
much more highly, and raise house prices.  Crime control is often part of the 
gentrification process.  The extent to which that would benefit the current citizens on net 
would depend on how many rented their property, i.e., not benefit from the price rise and   18
forced to pay higher rents, as opposed to those owning their property, who would have a 
more valuable asset to sell now or in the future.  Given political realities, and the fact that 
current residents vote, if there are mostly renters in a crime-afflicted area, it is unlikely 
such jumps in protection would be made in practice. 
Populations whose preferences change as the level of protection increases, 
thereby creating multiple equilibria, might be found in a range of situations.  Consider a 
country afflicted with massive corruption, where eliminating corruption would be costly 
enough that the present citizens might not find it worthwhile.  However, if corruption 
were addressed and completely eliminated, a capable business class might migrate to the 
country, which would find the policy to eliminate corruption worthwhile and who would 
bring economic growth to offset the costs.  
 
 
4. Protection as an Imperfect Public Good 
Up till now, we have assumed that protection only depends on the amount of 
government investment in protective capital.  In other words, we assumed that protection 
is perfectly non-rival: the cost of achieving a certain level of protection p does not depend 
on the amount of private capital protected and this cost can therefore be modeled as c(p).  
We recognized that increases in private capital could increase protection through 
increased government spending on protection, but ignored the possibility that, holding 
government spending constant, the level of private capital can directly affect protection.  
We now consider the case where protection is partially rival: the cost of protection now 
also increases with the amount of capital protected.  We model this cost as c(p, K), with 
∂c/∂p>0 and ∂c/∂K>0.  Stated differently, this section examines the case where holding 
government spending on protection constant, the level of protection can fall as the stock 
of protected capital increases. 
There are several reasons why the cost of protection may rise with investment 
levels.  First, this could occur if increases in capital increase the likelihood that the 
investment will be a target for crime.  Larger homes may be more attractive targets for 
burglary, for example.  As Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) note, population concentrations 
become attractive targets in terrorism and war.  The World Trade Towers were targeted   19
in part due to their size and importance.  Barns in Iowa, by contrast, are not targets for 
terrorist attacks.  Increases in capital can also increase the costs of providing protection  
when the risk is from natural disasters, for two reasons.  First, development may initially 
occur in safe areas, but as private capital increases, assets may be placed in less safe 
areas, so that marginal investments are less protected.  In this situation, the later 
developments do not change the safety level of the original investment, but they are less 
protected than the earlier capital stock, raising the cost of achieving some average level 
of protection.  Second, increases in private capital can actually alter the protection of all 
development in the region when natural protection is compromised, increasing the costs 
to the government of maintaining that protection level.  These two situations occur, for 
example, as floodplains develop.  
  Consider a locality situated near a river prone to flooding.  Initial investment may 
occur outside of the floodplain, where the risk of flooding is low.  As this area fills up, 
further increases in the capital stock will dribble and then flow into the floodplain. This is 
akin to the first situation discussed in the previous paragraph.  Now assume that the 
floodplain contains many acres of wetlands.  Wetlands act as a natural sponge, absorbing 
floodwaters and then slowly releasing them, thereby providing natural flood protection  
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1995).  If the later investment fills these 
wetlands, not only is this investment at a greater risk of flooding, but it has also increased 
the risk to all the preceding capital stock by destroying the natural flood protection in the 
locality.  This will require costly construction, e.g., of a levee, to restore the level of 
protection the original capital stock enjoyed, and such construction may not be justified 
on a cost-benefit basis. 
Some localities in the United States have found that permanently protecting 
wetlands is more cost effective for two reasons:  they provide flood protection, and they 
prevent development in the most risky areas.  Just such an approach was taken in the 
1970s along the Charles River, which begins at Echo Lake in Hopkinton, flowing eighty 
miles to empty into Boston Harbor.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers found that 
wetland protection incurred one-tenth the estimated costs of a dam and levee project that 
would store an equivalent amount of water (National Research Council 2004).  Other   20
areas, such as Napa, California and Reno, Nevada, are also using wetlands to provide 
flood protection.   
 
4.1 Direct and Indirect Effects on Protection of an Increase in Private Capital  
If protection is to some extent rival, the direct effect of an exogenous increase in 
private capital is to reduce the level of protection.  If expenditures were held fixed, 
protection levels would fall due to the increase in the cost of protection from the increase 
in capital.  However, there is also an indirect effect: the exogenous increase in private 
capital raises the marginal benefit of protection and may therefore induce the government 
to spend more on protection.  Here we examine the net effect of these two forces. 
As before, we have the firm choosing its level of assets to maximize profits, but 
we now multiply the production function by a productivity level α in order to introduce a 
source of exogenous changes in the level of private assets:  
 
(10)  π(K, p, α) = αf(K) – (1-p)K.  
 
Given a level of protection p and productivity level α, the firm will select a level of 
capital so that the net returns to capital are equal to the probability of losing the capital 
due to imperfect protection: 
 
(11)   αf '(K) = 1-p. 
 
Assume, as before, that f(K) is increasing and concave. In this case, (11) has a unique 
solution, which is given by K(p, α).  Moreover, since f(K) is concave, f '(K) is a 
decreasing function and therefore K(p, a) is increasing in p and in α.  Thus, not 
surprisingly, private capital will increase in response to higher levels of protection and in 
response to positive productivity shocks.   
As before, the marginal benefit of protection is equal to the stock of private 
capital, thus: 
 
(12) ∂b(p, α)/∂p = K(p, α).   21
 
So, the effect of the productivity shock α on the marginal benefit of protection is: 
 
(13)   ∂
2b(p, α)/∂p∂α = ∂K/∂α > 0. 
 
To determine the net effect of the productivity shock, we next examine its effect on the 
marginal cost of protection.  If it increases the marginal cost of protection more than the 
marginal benefits of protection, the productivity shock (and the resulting exogenous 
increase in capital) reduces the level of protection.  Assume that the government takes the 
level of private assets as given when determining the level of protection.
6  The effect of 
productivity shock α on the marginal cost of protection is given by: 
 
(14)  d(∂c(p, K(p, α)/∂p)/dα  = cpK ∂K/∂α, 
 
where cpK denotes the cross-partial derivative of c(p, K). 
Thus, whenever cpK > 1, the productivity shock increases marginal cost more than 
marginal benefit (which equals ∂K/∂α), and the equilibrium amount of protection will fall 
in any stable equilibrium.  Moreover, if the marginal cost rises sufficiently, this may even 
eliminate one of the equilibria, thereby causing a jump in protection associated with 
switching to a new equilibrium.  For example, in figure 2, a sufficiently large 
productivity shock will eliminate equilibrium C.  Thus, if equilibrium C initially were the 
global optimum, a sufficient productivity increase would lead to a discrete downward 
jump in protection from the level associated with C to the level associated with A. 
  To provide a better intuition for the condition cpK > 1, note that at any optimum 
the marginal cost of protection must equal the capital stock cp = K.   Thus, at any 
equilibrium, the condition cpK  = ∂cp/∂K > 1 is equivalent to ∂ln(cp)/∂ln(K).  Thus cpK > 1 
means that the elasticity of the marginal protection costs with respect to the size of the 
assets protected is greater than one.  This is akin to decreasing returns to scale in the size 
of assets protected.  This is most plausible in the situations discussed above, such as 
                                                 
6 Thus, we are assuming a Nash equilibrium in the game where government sets the level of protection and 
private sector sets the level of private capital, rather than the government being a Stackelberg leader.   22
terrorism, where once assets reach a critical level they become an attractive target.  In 
most cases, however, such as investment in crime-ridden neighborhoods, the elasticity 
should be smaller than one.  Thus, even when protection is rival, we would expect the 
level of protection to fall in response to an exogenous increase in private capital only in 
very rare circumstances (namely, when cpK > 1). 
 
 
5.  Uncertainty and the Optimal Government Protection Decision 
In practice, the government is likely to face considerable uncertainty about the 
marginal benefit of protection.  This section examines the optimal level of government 
investment in protection given this uncertainty, in three cases.  First, we examine a 
decision under uncertainty when the level of protection can not be adjusted later.  Second, 
we investigate how the optimal level of first-period protection changes if the government 
can purchase additional protection at a higher price in period two, after uncertainty about 
the benefit of protection has been resolved.  In this second case, we assume the benefit 
function is sufficiently well-behaved that there is only one local maximum.  The third 
case is identical to the second case but allows for a poorly behaved benefit function, and 
multiple local maxima.  In all cases, we assume that the cost of protection depends on the 
level of protection but not on the level of private capital; that is, we assume that 
protection is a pure public good. 
 
5.1 Decision under uncertainty without the possibility of adjustment 
To explore the effects of uncertainty, we use a two-period model.  In the first 
period, the benefits of protection are still uncertain, since there is uncertainty about the 
level of private productivity, which in turn affects the level of investment.  Nevertheless, 
the government must decide on a level of protection, p, which is achieved by purchasing 
government capital.  We normalize the price of government capital to one in the first 
period.  Government capital, G, provides protection as given by the function p(G) ≡ c
-
1(G).  In the second period, uncertainty about the benefits of protection is resolved, and 
firms decide on their level of investment.     23
The uncertainty in period 1 derives from uncertainty in the productivity parameter 
α in the production functions for firms.  This creates uncertainty in the value of 
protection, as the government does not know how many firms will choose to locate in the 
region.  The rebuilding of New Orleans is a prime example of this type of uncertainty, as 
the government struggles to determine protection plans without being sure of the extent 
to which the city will be rebuilt and New Orleanians will return.   
Let the cumulative distribution of α be given by Φ(α).  When α is realized and p is 
known, the firms choose the level of capital to maximize profits: 
 
(15)  π(K, p, α) = αf(K) – (1-p)K.  
 
The resulting level of private capital is given by K(p, α), which is both increasing in p and 
α.  The total private benefit from protection is given by: 
 
(16)  b(p, α) = π(K(p, α), p). 
 
The government, faced with uncertainty in this benefits function, selects the level 
of protection by maximizing expected surplus 
 
(17)  [ ] max E ( , ) ( )
p bp cp α α − . 
 
Since the derivative of the benefit function with respect to protection is equal to the level 
of private capital, the first order condition of this maximization is: 
 
(18) Eα[K(p, α)] = c'(p). 
 
Thus, if the government has no opportunity to alter protection levels in the future, its 
decision regarding the level of protection to provide should be based on the expected 
quantity of private investment.  This type of expectation is not uncommon.  Consider, for 
example, the case of the Riverside Levee in Kansas City mentioned earlier.  Senator Kit 
Bond’s office noted that the projections made before the levee was completed suggested   24
that it would result in the creation of 11 million square feet of development (Bond 2005).  
This figure is the expected quantity of private investment. 
Alternatively, we can rewrite optimization in terms of G: 
(19)  () max ( ), ( )
G bp G Gd α α
∞
−∞
−Φ   ∫ , 
 
which yields the following first order condition: 
 
(20) Eα [K(p(G); α)] p'(G) = 1. 
 
This equation is equivalent to our base equation, elaborated to allow for uncertainty in the 
benefit function.  The expected marginal benefit of protection times the marginal 
protection per unit of G is the marginal benefit of G.  This first-order condition simply 
states that the expected marginal benefit of G should equal the price of G (which we 
normalized to one). 
 
5.2. Possibility of adjustment in the case without multiple equilibria 
In reality, there is usually some scope for the government to later provide more 
protection.
7  Protection may be increased if new technology makes protection cheaper, if 
risk levels are re-estimated upwards, or if the level of investment at risk unexpectedly 
increases.  An example of the first case is the creation of vaccines for many diseases, like 
polio and TB, which once killed many, but now, due to affordable vaccines, are no longer 
a health threat.  An example of the second is the huge increase in federal spending on 
airport security following 9/11.  The Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley expenditure 
allocations for protection, mentioned earlier, illustrate the third.  The focus of this paper 
is on case three.   
In many cases, retrofitting to increase protection levels is more expensive than 
providing a higher level of protection initially.  For example, increasing protective 
                                                 
7 Downward adjustment is unlikely to be relevant.  In most cases, it would cost money to reduce the level 
of protective capital once the capital has been installed.  That is, the resale price is negative (e.g., it costs 
more in terms of labor costs to reduce the height of a levy than it yields in terms of the value of sand, rocks 
and scrap metal).   25
structural works, such as levees, requires mobilizing designers, planners, and construction 
crews twice.  More important, there are significant technological costs to building 
increments to levees, or other infrastructure that protects.  For example, taller levees 
require deeper underpinnings, which are exceedingly expensive to create once the shorter 
first levee is in place.  Levee expansions also require additional land, and nearby property 
values generally increase once a levee is built.  This penalty for later increases in 
protection may not hold for recurrent protective expenditures, such as services.  For 
example, hiring an extra police officer later is not more expensive than hiring him or her 
earlier.   
We follow Abel, Dixit, Eberly, and Pindyck’s (1996) flexible specification for 
these adjustment costs but modify their analysis for the case of government investment in 
protection.  We assume that additional capital bought in period 2 costs z2 ≥ 1.  If z2 equals 
one, expansion entails no adjustment costs (as with hiring more guards to protect a plant 
when assets in the plant increase).  By contrast, when z2 tends to infinity, expansion is 
prohibitively expensive.  
As before, at the beginning of period 2, the productivity shock α is realized.  The 
government now has the option to adjust its level of protection.  Firms know their 
productivity level, and through a simultaneous adjustment process, firm investment levels 
and government protection are determined.    
In this section, we assume that the marginal benefit function mb(G,α) ≡  
db(p(G), α)/dG = K(p(G); α) p'(G) is a decreasing function of G for all values of α.  This 
assumption ensures that the first-order condition mb(G,α) = z2 yields one solution that 
corresponds to the globally optimal level of government investment.  We have seen that 
once we allow private investment to respond to the level of protection, this assumption 
rules out important cases.  In section 5.3 below, we relax this restrictive assumption. 
For a given level of government investment in the first period, G1, there is a 
critical value α(G1) of the productivity parameter α such that for any α > α(G1) it is 
optimal to purchase additional protection in the second period.  Note that this does not 
imply any lack of planning or anticipation in the first period.  The uncertainty to 
productivity was well recognized at the time of the first protection decision, and society   26
got an unusually favorable draw.  The critical value α(G1) is defined as the value of α that 
solves: 
 
(21)  mb(G1,α) = z2.  
 
Since mb(G1,α) is monotonically increasing in α and monotonically decreasing in 
G, equation (21) has a unique solution for α.  Only for productivity realizations beyond 
α(G1) does the marginal benefit of purchasing additional government protective capital 
exceed the higher second-period price of these goods, and it is therefore optimal to 
expand protection.  In this case, the optimal level of protective government capital is 
denoted by G2(α), which is the solution to mb(G2,α) = z2.  Thus, G2, the amount of 
second-period government capital, is given by: 
 
G2 = G1           for α ≤ α(G1), and  
G2 = G2(α)       for  α(G1) < α.  
 
Taking into account the option of expanding in the second period, the government 
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The expression C(G1) is the value of the call option of being able to purchase additional 
capital.  The optimal level of first-period government capital is found by differentiating 
expression (23) with respect to G1: 
 
(25) E[mb(G,α)] + C
 '(G1)  = E[K(p(G1), α)] p'(G1) + C
 '(G1) = 1. 
 
Thus, the expected marginal benefit of government investment plus its marginal effect on 
the value of the implicit call option must equal unity.  The marginal effect on the call 
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Increasing the level of first-period investment reduces the marginal value of the 
option of future expansions.  Thus, the value of the call option decreases with G1.  
Because C' is negative, first-period investment will be at a level where the expected 
marginal benefit strictly exceeds unity.  In other words, the government will invest less in 
the first period when it has an option to expand than it would if it had to choose its level 
of government capital once and for all.  Since ∂C'(G1)/∂z2 =
 1-Φ(α(G1)) > 0, first-period 
government investment is rising in the price of second-period protective capital: the 
option of future expansion becomes less attractive when future investment becomes more 
expensive.  These results are consistent with Pindyck’s (2000) analysis of the role of 
option value in the one-time and irreversible decision of adopting a policy that reduces 
emissions of a pollutant. 
 
5.3. Possibility of adjustment in the case with multiple equilibria 
Now we relax the assumption that mb(G,α), the marginal benefit of more 
protective capital, is monotonically decreasing in the amount of protective capital for any 
level of productivity shock α.  Instead, we allow for any shape of the marginal benefit 
function such that for sufficiently high or low values of G the marginal benefit function is   28
downward sloping.  For intermediate values of G, the marginal benefit function may have 
upward sloping regions as long as the equation  
 
(27)  mb(G, α) = z2   
 
has at most three solutions for G for any value of α.  The canonical case is thus a wave-
shaped marginal benefit function, as depicted in figure 3.  This benefit function has 
government protective capital G as an argument, unlike in section 2.5, where the parallel 
argument was protection, p. 
  Marginal benefit functions of this nature are empirically quite plausible, and they 
occur because the level of private investment responds to the level of protection, as 
discussed in section 2.5.  For example, at low levels of spending it is only possible to 
build a small levee, suitable for protecting agricultural fields but not more capital-
intensive development.  As marginal spending increases, net benefits fall, and possibly 
even become negative.  At some level of spending, however, a levee can be built that will 
provide enough protection for more extensive development.  At this point, the marginal 
benefit function begins to increase.  Finally, at some very high level of spending, the 
marginal benefits function once again falls.    29
 
















Figure 3: Wave-shaped marginal benefit functions for different levels of productivity α  
 
As a result of our assumptions, equation (27) has only one real root for 
sufficiently low or sufficiently high values of α, but three real roots (of which two are 
stable) for intermediate values of α.  The stable roots define the locally optimal levels of 
government investment in protective capital.  Call the smallest root of equation (27) 
GL(α), which is defined on the interval (-∞,
max
L α ]. Similarly, let the largest root be 
defined by GH(α) on the interval [
min
H α , ∞).  Thus, on the interval [
min
H α , 
max
L α ], equation 
(27) has two distinct stable roots. 
Define α
* as the value of α for which it is just cost-effective to move from the low 
equilibrium to the high equilibrium at the second-period price of protective capital. That 
is, α
* solves: 
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*, moving from the low local equilibrium to the high local equilibrium just 
breaks even.  Thus for any value of α above α
*, it will never be optimal to select the low 
equilibrium.  This means that for first-period levels of government investment G > 
GL(α
*), the government will never end up at the low equilibrium in the second period. 
Now we are ready to define αH(G), which is the critical value of α for every level 
of first-period government capital such that for any α > αH(G) the government will 
purchase sufficient additional protective capital to achieve the high equilibrium: 
 
αH(G) = α
*           f o r   G ≤ GL(α
*), 






mb G z dG
α
α −= ∫      for GL(α
*) < G ≤ GH(
min
H α ), and 
αH(G) solves  GH(α) = G           for GH(
min
H α ) < G. 
 
Similarly, define αL(G) as the minimum value of α for every level of current 
investment such that for any α > αL(G) the government will purchase additional 
protective capital: 
 
αL(G) solves GL(α) = G            for G ≤ GL(α
*), and 
αL(G) = αH(G)        f o r   GL(α
*) < G. 
 
Thus G2(G1, α), the optimal period-two level of government capital for every combination 
of productivity shock α and first-period government capital, is given by: 
 
G2 = G1    for   α ≤ αL(G1), 
G2 = GL(α) for  αL(G1) < α ≤  αH(G1), and  
G2 = GH(α) for  αH(G1) < α.  






*) – z2 (GH(α
*)- GL(α
*)) = 0.   31
 
Note that the second condition, αL(G1) < α ≤  αH(G1), leads to the empty set for α for any 
GL(α
*) < G1 because αL(G1) = αH(G1) for G1 > GL(α
*).  The set of parameters for which 
the government chooses a second-period investment level of G1 (downward diagonals), 
























Figure 4: Optimal level of second-period protective capital as a function of α and G1. 
 
The government sets the first-period level of protective capital to maximize the expected 
net benefit taking into account the possibility of future expansion: 
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The function CL(G1) is the value of the call option to purchase the additional 
capital needed to achieve the low equilibrium, while CH(G1) is the value of the call option 
to purchase the additional capital needed to achieve the high equilibrium.  The optimal 
level of first-period government capital is found by differentiating expression (29) with 
respect to G1: 
 
(30) Eα[mb(G,α)] + CL'(G1) + CH'(G1) = Eα[K
*(p(G1); α)] p'(G1) + CL'(G1) + CH'(G1) = 1. 
 
Thus, as in the previous section, the expected marginal benefit of government 
investment plus its marginal effect on the call options must equal unity.  However, when 
the benefit function is wave-shaped, the option to expand later does not always reduce the 
first-period level of government capital.  Instead, there may be multiple equilibria, so that 
the option to increase the level of protection in the future has two potential effects on the 
optimal level of protective capital in the first period.  First, holding the choice of 
equilibrium for G1 constant (high or low), the option to expand may increase the level of 
G1.  As explained below, this surprising result is driven by the existence of multiple 
equilibria.  Second, the option to expand may tip the balance of which equilibrium for G1 
to select.  The direction in which it tips the balance depends on the exact shape of the 
marginal benefit function and the distribution of α.  Thus, the option to expand the 
amount of protection later may increase the optimal current level of protection.  
To better understand how call options affect the optimal choice of first-period 
government investment, it is useful to first analyze the derivatives of the call options.  
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This marginal effect is negative; the government will only purchase additional protective 
capital to reach the low equilibrium if the marginal benefit at the current level of   33
protection exceeds the price (because the low equilibrium is preceded by a downward 
sloping marginal benefit curve).  Intuitively, purchasing more first-period capital 
extinguishes the option of purchasing additional capital in the future and the value of the 
call option therefore decreases.  Thus,  1 '( ) 0 L CG≤  for all values of G1..  Moreover, for 
values of G1 > GL(α
*), the government would only expand to the high equilibrium and 
therefore CL'(G1) = 0. 
The marginal effect of first-period government investment on the high call option 













=− Φ ∫ . 
The derivative of the high call option could conceivably be positive because the marginal 
benefit function preceding the high equilibrium is not monotonically downward sloping.  
To facilitate determining the sign of this effect, it is useful to define mb
*(G1) ≡ 
mb(G1,αH(G1)).  Thus, the critical marginal benefit, mb
*(G1), is the lowest marginal 
benefit at the current level of protective capital for which it would make sense to 
purchase the additional capital to attain the high equilibrium in the second period.  We 
can then rewrite the derivative of the high option as: 
(33) 
*
12 1 1 1 ' ( ) ( ,) | ( ,) ( ) H CG Ezm b G m b G m b G α αα  =− >  . 
The critical marginal benefit is plotted as the dashed line in figure 5. 





























Figure 5.  Effect of the option to expand on the optimal first-period level of protection 
 
As we saw above, for values of G1 below GL(α
*), it only makes sense to go to the 
high equilibrium if productivity exceeds α
*: αH = α
*.  Thus, on this segment, mb
*(G1) = 
mb(G1, α





*) = z2, it follows that mb
*(G1) > z2 for G1 < GL(α
*).  Hence, 
the derivative of the high call option is negative in this range. 
For values of G1 above GL(α
*) but below GH(
min
H α ), the critical value αH, which 
productivity must exceed to go to the high equilibrium, is decreasing (recall figure 4).  
Thus, in this range, the critical marginal benefit shifts gradually from a relatively high 
marginal benefit curve mb(G,α
*) to the relatively low marginal benefit curve mb(G, 
min
H α ).  As a result, mb
*(G1) < z2 for GL(α
*) < G1 < GH(
min
H α ).  In this range, the 
expectation 
*
21 1 1 (, ) | (, ) () E z mb G mb G mb G α αα  −>   may therefore be positive.  
Whether it is positive depends on the distribution of α.  If the distribution of α makes it 
sufficiently likely that marginal benefit levels will be close to the critical benefit level as 
opposed to higher benefit levels (e.g., if Φ has a very thin right tail), then the expectation   35
is positive.  If marginal benefit levels above z2 are sufficiently likely (e.g., if Φ is very 
spread out or has a thick right tail), then this derivative is negative in this range. 
For values of G1 above GH(
min
H α ), we found the critical value, αH, as the value of 
α that solves mb(G1,α) = z2.  Thus, mb
*(G1) equals z2 and the derivative of the high call 
option is negative.  Thus to summarize: 
 
1 '( ) 0 H CG≤    for 
*
1 () L GG α ≤ , 
1 '( ) 0 H CG > <    for 
*m i n
1 () ( ) LH H GG G αα <≤ , and 
1 '( ) 0 H CG≤    for 
min
1 () HH GG α < . 
 
We can now analyze the effect of an option to expand on the optimal choice of 
first-period investment in protective capital.  Consider figure 5.  In the absence of the 
option to expand, the government would find the optimal level of G1 by equating the 
expected marginal benefit Eα[mb(G,α)] to the marginal cost (normalized to 1).  This 
yields two local maxima, G
A and G
D.  To determine which of these two is the global 
maximum, the government must calculate the net benefit of going from G
A and G
D, 
which is given by area D minus area C.  Thus, if D-C > 0, the government selects G
D and 
otherwise picks G
A.   
  Now consider the effect of the option to expand on each local equilibrium.  As 
drawn, the low local equilibrium, G
A, falls in the range where the derivative of the low 
call option is zero and where the derivative of the high call option can be positive.  If the 
latter derivative is positive (which happens, for example, if the probability that α>α
* is 
zero), then the option to expand increases the optimal amount of government investment, 
for example to G
B.  The intuition behind this surprising result is the following.  If the 
initial investment level G1 is between 
* () L G α  and 
min () HH G α , and if α is sufficiently high 
that it is worthwhile to increase the level of protection, then the first units of additional 
investment cost more than their marginal benefit.  (This is made up for by the later units 
of investment, whose marginal benefit exceeds their marginal cost.)  Thus, increasing the 
level of first-period investment reduces the number of units of additional investment 
undertaken at a marginal loss and therefore increases the option value of expanding.  As   36
drawn, the high local equilibrium has a level of government investment G
D that exceeds 
min () HH G α , and the derivative of the high call option is therefore negative.  As a result, the 
option to expand lowers the optimal level of first-period investment, for example to G
C, 
for the usual reasons. 
  Next consider the effect of the option to expand on the selection of one of the two 
local equilibria.  Suppose that the two local equilibria, G
B and G
C, have the same level of 
expected net benefits when ignoring the option to expand.  Thus, whichever local 
maximum has the higher option value is the global maximum.  The difference in the total 
value of the high call option is, by definition, the integral of the derivative of the high call 
option evaluated between G
B and G
C.  Because this derivative may be positive over much 
of this range, the total option value at G
C can be higher than G
B, in which case the option 
to expand leads to the selection of the higher equilibrium.  As we saw above, the 
derivative of the high call option is more likely to be positive if α has a thin right tail. 
Take, for example, an extreme case of a thin tail, namely that α is distributed on some 
interval with α
* as the upper bound. In that case, the government would expand 
investment only if the marginal benefit falls in the areas A or B.  The derivative of the 
high call option equals z2 - mb and is therefore positive for marginal benefits in area A 
while it is negative for marginal benefits in area B.  If the probability of the marginal 
benefit falling in area A rather than B is sufficiently high, then the value of the call option 
is higher for G
C than for G
B, and the higher local maximum is selected.  Intuitively, the 
option to expand is less valuable at G
B because the government first has to incur a loss 
(buying some additional capital at a marginal cost exceeding the marginal benefit) before 
reaping the benefit of expansion.  On the other hand, if α has sufficient mass in the far 
right tail, then the probability of having to incur losses before expanding is much lower, 




  The devastation wrought by hurricane Katrina along the Gulf Coast has once 
again reminded citizens, policymakers, and academics of the difficulties of making 
decisions regarding development in risk-prone locations.  This paper has highlighted that   37
government does not face a simple decision of how much protection to offer investments, 
nor do private entities face a simple decision of how much to invest in an area with a 
given risk level.  Instead, government and investors respond to each other, with 
investment increasing when protection levels are raised, and government raising 
protection when investment in a risky location grows.  When the marginal value of 
protection increases with the level of protection provided, the game may have multiple 
equilibria.  Thus, given an ill-behaved benefits function, a local optimum may not be the 
global optimum, which complicates policy decisions, as does the uncertainty regarding 
the level of investment that will follow a given level of protection.  The difficulty in these 
decision problems probably helps to explain why countries with stronger institutions 
suffer lower losses from natural disasters (Kahn 2005). The policy challenges are also 
evident in the recent discussions on rebuilding New Orleans, and in the debates on the 
level of protection that should be provided to the city.  When uncertainty prevails, the 
government should weigh the option values of being able to adjust protection levels in the 
future.  Despite these complexities in determining protection levels, or perhaps because 
of them, governments often blindly follow rules of thumb such as providing protection 
from the 100-year flood or 1000-year flood.  Society may make more optimal levels of 
investment if instead we critically examine the costs and benefits of spending on 
protection, basing our decisions on the level (or expected level) of investments that will 
be at risk.   38
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